Domingo de Soto on the *Categories*: Words, Things, and Denominatives

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Despite humanist attacks, notably by Petrus Ramus, Porphyry's *Isagoge* and Aristotle's *Categories* retained their place in university education throughout the sixteenth century and into the seventeenth century. Indeed, as late as the 1660s the logic notes in John Locke's early manuscripts are largely devoted to predication, the five predicables, and the ten categories,[1] and in his *Essay concerning human understanding* Locke found it necessary to complain about those "bred up in the Peripatetick Philosophy" who "think the Ten Names, under which are ranked the Ten Predicaments, to be exactly conformable to the Nature of Things".[2] Original and sustained discussion of these matters is, however, harder to find. Most textbooks cover the issues only in a summary fashion, and such a leading commentator as Agostino Nifo wrote no commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge* or on the *Categories*. Domingo de Soto is one exception. His substantial commentary on the *Categories*, combined with commentaries on Porphyry's *Isagoge* and Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*, was published 18 times between 1543 and 1598, mainly in Salamanca, but with one edition in Louvain and five in Venice.[3]

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1. See Ashworth forthcoming.

2. Locke, *Essay*, III.x.14, p. 497.

3. Lohr 1988: 431. For a general summary of Soto's position, see Bos 2000. For a useful introduction to medieval views, see Pini 2002. For Soto on equivocation, see Ashworth 1996. Bos and Ashworth give different dates for Soto's birth, but Angel d'Ors (in private correspondence) supported the view that 1494 is the correct date. I owe much to Angel d'Ors († 2012) for his useful comments on an earlier version of this paper.

In his commentary, Soto addresses the main questions faced by medieval and Renaissance thinkers, namely does the work deal with words or things, and why is it classified as an introduction to logic? He then takes up a number of subsidiary questions, two of which I shall discuss below. First, why does the work begin with the discussion of equivocals, univocals and denominatives? Second, are denominatives really like equivocals and univocals in relevant respects? In what follows I shall begin by sketching Soto's main conclusions about the nature and purpose of Aristotle's *Categories* as a whole. This will lead me into a discussion of predication, and what it is that we predicate. I shall then turn to the subsidiary questions about why the work opens as it does, and about the status of denominatives.

1. The Nature and Purpose of Aristotle's *Categories*

I begin with the question of whether the *Categories* is about words or things. Here we should note that Soto, like many of his predecessors, assumed that 'words' included mental terms or concepts as well as written and spoken words, so that Simplicius's listing of a third view, that the *Categories* is about concepts,[4] was not a subject of discussion for Soto. Walter Burley, whom Soto occasionally cites, had begun his preface to the *Ars vetus* by considering all three candidates for the subject of logic, and, after stating that an intention was the concept of a thing, had argued that logic was concerned with second intentions insofar as they were added to first intentions.[5] In the prologue to his last commentary on the *Categories*, Burley only considered things and words, and argued that the *Categories* was principally about things, though once more he insisted on their re-

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4. Simplicius, *In Cat.*, p. 13.
5. Walter Burley, *In art.* vet., sig. a 2rB–vA. He wrote (sig. 2rB): "Et est dicendum secundum Avicennam in *Logica* sua quod logica est de intentionibus secundis adiunctis primis." He added (sig. a 2vA): "Non enim determinatur in logica de homine nisi inquantum est species, vel subiectum vel predicatum propositionis, vel inquantum est terminus in syllogismo .... Similiter non determinatur de vocibus in logica, nisi inquantum significant res ut eis insunt intentiones secunde."

lation to second intentions such as *genus* and *species*.[6] Paul of Venice, whom Soto also cites, had argued against Burley that the logician is concerned not only with things in relation to second intentions, but in themselves and according to their modes and properties.[7]

Soto himself lists three possibilities (*In Cat.*, pp. 106B–107A). One is the standard view put forward by Boethius, that the *Categories* is about words insofar as they are significative of things.[8] The second is the view that the *Categories* is about things, and here he cites Averroes and Eustratius. The final view is that of the nominalists, who hold that the *Categories* is about words alone. The point to be emphasized here is that on the first two views, logic and ontology are normally taken to be parallel, in that categorial terms mirror real ontological divisions, whereas the nominalists denied any such parallelism.[9]

Soto summed up his answer to the question of whether the *Categories* is about words or things by giving five theses. I will start with the first three. Thesis one is that both words and things are put in categories.[10] If one takes the ordered sequence *man, animal, living, body, substance*, then one can say that with respect to things, man is a rational animal, and that an animal is a living thing able to sense,

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6. Walter Burley, *In art. vet.*, sig. c 3vA–vB. Burley's two earlier commentaries were presumably unavailable to Soto.

7. Paul of Venice, *In Cat.*, fol. 79rA–vB. He writes (fol. 79vA) "Sequitur quod logicus non solum considerat 10 predicamenta per respectum ad intentiones secundas ut Burlaeus asserit … logicus videtur considerare predicamenta non solum per respectum ad intentiones secundas sed magis secundum se et secundum ea que accidunt eis tanquam modi aut proprietates."

8. Boethius, *In Categorias*, cols. 159C –160B.

9. I say 'normally' because not all those of a realist persuasion believed that there were exactly ten categories.

10. Domingo de Soto, *In Cat.*, p.107A: "Prima, tam res quam voces ponuntur in praedicamento … Probatur. Homo a parte rei est animal rationale, et animal est vivens sensibile, et vivens est corpus animatum, et corpus est substantia corporea; ergo in rebus ipsis, puta in quocunque homine, est animal contractum per rationale ad esse hominis, et vivens contractum per sensibile ad esse animalis, et pariter reliqua superiora genera, atque adeo res sunt in praedicamento …. Quod vero nomina ponuntur in praedicamento probatur. A qualibet essentiali convenientia abstrahit intellectus formalem conceptum adaequatum eius, ergo qualis est ordo in rebus, talis est in istis nominibus, 'homo', 'animal', 'vivens', 'corpus', 'substantia', tanquam in rerum signis."

and so on. Hence we can say of things themselves that in every man, *animal* is contracted by *rational* to bring about the *esse* of *man*, and in every animal, *living thing* is contracted by *able to sense* to bring about the *esse* of *animal*. All this is confirmed by *Metaphysics* 5 where Aristotle divides real being (*ens reale*) into the ten categories. On the other hand, wherever there is an essential agreement in things, the intellect abstracts formal adequate concepts of the essential agreements involved, and so, just as there is an order in the real things, there is an order in the names 'man', 'animal' and 'living'. Thesis two is that not only names but things are predicated.[11] Things are predicated really and objectively, and names are predicated instrumentally and as signs of things. Although names are predicated more properly, things are predicated more principally. Thesis three is that the book of *Categories* is about things insofar as things are signified by names, and about names insofar as they signify things, but it is more principally about things.[12] Soto claims that this is the view of Pseudo-Augustine in the *Categoriae decem*, and of Avicenna.

This rapid outline of Soto's first three theses has obviously raised a number of issues which need to be addressed, including the nature of a category, the nature of predication, the nature of the things predicated, and the nature of second intentions. To begin with the first issue, Soto denied that the word 'praedicamentum' supposited only for the highest member of each category. Instead, he described a category or *praedicamentum* as an ordering (*ordinatio*) of predicates of which the higher are predicated quidditatively of the lower, and his example is the sequence *man, animal, living, body, substance*.[13] This is

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11. Domingo de Soto, *In Cat.*, p. 107B: "Non solum nomina sed res etiam praedicantur: res quidem realiter, et obiective, sed nomina instrumentaliter et tanquam rerum signa; et quamvis nomina forte magis proprie, tamen res principalius."

12. Domingo de Soto, *In Cat.*, p. 109A: "Liber praedicamentorum est de rebus in quantum nominibus significantur, et de nominibus in quantum significant res; sed principalius tractat de rebus."

13. Domingo de Soto, *In Cat.*, p. 106A: "Est ergo praedicamentum praedicatorum ordinatio, quorum superiora de inferioribus quidditative praedicantur. Ut series illa quae in arbore Porphyrii ante oculos posita est: puta, homo, animal, vivens, corpus, substantia …. Igitur praedicamentum non supponit, ut aliqui arbitrantur, pro generalissimo."

not a new description. In the thirteenth century Lambert of Auxerre (or Lagny), for instance, wrote that a category is "ordinatio predicabilium in linea predicamentali".[14] Soto linked his remarks to the claim that since the subject of the *Categories* is the *praedicamentum*, it considers only what is "ponibile in praedicamento" (*In Cat.*, p. 106B). Once more his description seems to be closely linked to a standard claim, namely that the material subject of the *Categories* is "ens dicibile incomplexum ordinabile in genere": a simple predicable being which can be ordered in a genus.[15] Later he claims that no matter how people stand with relation to the priority of words or things, they all agree that a *praedicamentum* is a *praedicatorum series* (*In Cat.*, p. 109B).

2. Soto on Predication

We now have to ask what predication is for Domingo de Soto. Properly speaking, it is the linguistic act of affirming or denying something of a subject (*In Cat.*, p. 107A, 108B), and he writes that predication is not brought about in things, but is only exercised in the mind, in utterance, or in writing (*In Cat.*, p. 108B, reading 'fit' rather than 'sit'). The act of predication is expressed in a proposition, and, contrary to Walter Burley, whom Soto attacks at some length (*In Cat.*, p. 107A–B, pp. 108B–109A) propositions themselves are not to be found among things.[16] They are resolved into nouns and verbs, and they have properties such as being exclusive or exceptive which depend on syncategorematic terms. It is their significates that are things, not the propositions themselves. On the other hand, there is a sense in which things are indeed predicated. Names signify things, for they are instrumental signs, and the purpose of using names in a linguistic predication is to reveal truths about things, especially about their essential natures. Insofar as the knowledge of quiddities is the true end of essential predication, we can say that although names are properly predicated, things are not only "really and ob-

14. Lambert, *Logica*, p. 50. He explained that "Predicabile idem est quod dicibile."
15. See Ashworth 1997: 288. Burley uses the phrase: *In art. vet.*, sig. c 3vA.
16. See Walter Burley, *In art. vet.*, sig. c 3vB–c 4vA.

jectively" predicated (*In Cat.*, p. 107B) but are principally predicated (*In Cat.*, p. 108A).[17]

If we ask what these things are that are principally predicated, we have to make a distinction between individual things and universal things. As Soto argues in his commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*, singulars, such as Socrates, are never properly predicated. They are natural subjects, and can be predicates only in some extended sense.[18] On the other hand, there are no separate or separable universal things. Soto is quite clear on this point.[19] Everything in the world is really individual and singular (*In Porph.*, p. 30B). Universals are predicated of things and exist in things (*In Porph.*, p. 30B), for Peter is a man through humanity and white through whiteness, but they are only rationally distinguished from individuals.[20] Moreover, while things are species and genera in a simple sense (*simpliciter*) before the action of the intellect, given that Peter and Paul are men, and that men are animals,[21] nothing is an actual universal until it has been abstracted by the intellect, for to be an actual universal is to be an actual intelligible.[22] In his commentary on the *Categories*, Soto

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17. For text, see Appendix One: On Predication.

18. Ashworth 2004: 533–535.

19. For discussion, see van der Lecq 2000: 309–325.

20. Domingo de Soto, *In Porph.*, p. 32B: "… sicut enim Petrus non est albus nisi per albedinem quae est in illo, ita non est homo, nisi per naturam hominis quae est in illo; ergo universale est in singularibus. Rursus, ratio hominis secundum esse materiale quod habet in Petro non potest esse in Paulo, quia in Petro est facta haec per conditiones singulares, quae repugnant Paulo; ergo non habet quod fit [or 'sit'?] universalis vel communis nisi per abstractionem intellectus a conditionibus singularibus cuiuscunque individui. Abstrahi vero per intellectum nihil aliud est, pro nunc, quam concipi conceptu communi. Itaque homo ipse singularis quatenus est obiectum huius conceptus universalis *homo* dicitur universale, Et dicitur ratio communis, et natura hominis, et hoc est universale distingui ratione a singularibus."

21. Domingo de Soto, *In Porph.*, p. 37A: "Res nihilominus ante quamcumque operationem intellectus sunt simpliciter species et genera …. Itaque, licet sine operatione intellectus, non sint universalia in actu; tamen sufficit ut sint species et genera, quod Petrus, verbi gratia, sit homo, et Paulus sit homo, et homo sit animal, et equus sit animal."

22. Domingo de Soto, *In Porph.*, p. 36B: "Res non est universale in actu nisi quando actu abstrahitur species intelligibilis a phantasmatibus. Probatur: esse universale in actu est esse intelligibile in actu, quia universale est obiectum intellectus, sed res non est intelligibile in actu nisi quando actu abstrahitur eius species …."

adds that to say that things are predicated in a basic sense (*fundamen-taliter*) before the operation of the intellect is just to say, for example, that the *ratio* of man is in Peter substantially, and the *ratio* of whiteness is in Peter accidentally. Actual predication occurs when the intellect actually considers one thing as a subject, that of which something is said, and another thing as predicate, that which is said of another (*In Cat.*, p. 108A). Things are then said to be predicated "passively and objectively" (*In Cat.*, p. 108B).[23]

At this point, further distinctions need to be made. Intelligible species or concepts of the intellect are universals *in repraesentando*, but not universals *in praedicando* (*In Porph.*, p. 28B; cf. *In Cat.*, p. 108A). The former are formal concepts, which exist as acts or qualities of mind; the latter are objective concepts, which are the objects immediately signified by the formal concepts.[24] Real singular things such as men and animals as considered by the intellect are in the intellect objectively, and, as the objects of the concepts *man* and *animal*, are universals.[25] They can also be called 'first intentions' because *man* and *animal* are what is first conceived by the mind, and they are not relational, even though they are called 'first intentions' because of a relation to the intellect. In this they are unlike second intentions such as *genus* and *species*, which are not only beings of reason (*entia rationis*) rather than real beings, but are also relations of reason, brought about by the mind's reflection on and ordering of its first intentions.[26]

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23. See Appendix One for texts relating to this paragraph.

24. *In Porph.*, p. 30B: "… notandum est duplicem esse conceptum. Alius est formalis, qui est qualitas potentiae cognoscitivae, qua res formaliter cognoscimus; et alius est conceptus obiectivus, qui est formaliter obiectum immediate significatum per conceptum formalem, puta per notitiam."

25. *In Porph.*, p. 33A: "Universalia sunt in rebus, sed universalitas est obiective in intellectum … res ipsae singulares in essendo, quatenus sunt obiecta horum conceptuum *homo*, *animal*, et similium, sunt universalia."

26. *In Porph.*, pp. 38B–39A: "Est igitur prima intentio id quod primo concipitur de re, id est, quod convenit rei de se sine respectu ad operationem intellectus. Et secunda intentio est id quod secundo concipitur de re, id est, proprietas quae consequitur in re per operationem intellectus …. Ex quo sequitur primo, quod si intentio accipiatur formaliter, utraque est ens reale, ut puta subiective et realiter existens in intellectu. Si vero accipiatur obiective, prima intentio est ens reale, sed secunda intentio est ens

The issue of first and second intentions brings us to Soto's last two theses. Thesis four is that things are considered in relation to the second intention 'to be predicated', given that they are considered as ordered in predication.[27] Here Soto says that he is seeking a middle road between Burley, who held that logic was concerned with things only as they were the basis for such second intentions as *genus* and *species*, and Paul of Venice, who denied this (*In Cat.*, p. 109B).[28] The final thesis is that whereas Porphyry's *Isagoge* considered second intentions as such, the *Categories* focuses on first intentions as the basis for predication.[29]

Soto's discussion of the last two theses allows him to answer the question of why the *Categories* is classified as a work of logic rather than of metaphysics (*In Cat.*, p. 109B). This question had become important in the thirteenth century, with the recovery of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, and it was normal to maintain that the metaphysician and the logician approach the categories from different viewpoints.[30] Soto is no different. The metaphysician, he argues, considers such second intentions as *genus* and *species* in order to explain the nature of things, whereas the logician reverses the process and considers things as they will be employed in predication. Moreover, while the

rationis. Sequitur secundo quod prima intentio non est relatio, nam natura hominis, natura animalis, et quaecumque res mundi, est prima intentio, quamquam denominatur sic per respectum ad intellectum, quia est primum cognitum. Sed secunda intentio est relatio rationis."

27. *In Cat.*, p. 109B: "Negari non potest quin considerentur hic res in ordine ad secundum intentionem, quae est praedicari …. Est enim differentia inter logicum et metaphysicum, quod logicus tractat de rebus, ut cognoscat earum intentionis praedicandi; metaphysicus vero econverso, si tractat de intentionibus, ut 5. *Met.* tractatur de genere etc., id facit, ut explicet naturas rerum."

28. For references, see above, notes 6 and 7.

29. *In Cat.*, p. 109B: "Non considerantur hic secundae intentiones quemadmodum in praedicabilibus. Non enim definitur hic quid sit genus aut species, aut aliud universale, sed explicantur naturae substantiae, quantitatis, etc., ut in particulari cognoscatur quid de quo praedicatur praedicatione generis aut accidentis, etc. Quocirca considerantur proprietates substantiae et aliorum praedicamentorum secundum esse reale, ut recipere magis et minus, recipere contraria etc. Sed tamen omnia tractantur, ut inde sumatur iudicium praedicationis."

30. Pini 2002:19-27.

purpose of Porphyry's *Isagoge* was to explain the nature of *genus*, *species*, and other universals, the purpose of the *Categories* is to explain the nature of substance, quantity, and the other categories in order to know what can be predicated of what. As a result, the logician has to consider the properties of substances and accidents according to their real being, as apt to to be qualified by more and less, to receive contraries, and so on. All this is done in order to "provide the judgement of predication". A little later, Soto argues that whereas the metaphysician considers things according to their natural and absolute being, the logician considers them as they come under the operations of reason, and give rise to different kinds of predication, such as *per se* and accidental. Moreover, he does not consider second intentions directly (as in the *Isagoge*) but rather things, in order to know whether to classify them under *genus*, *species* or *accident*. (*In Cat.*, pp. 110B–111A). As a result, the *Categories* is indeed suitably placed as an introduction to logic. Logicians have to know about such universals as *genus* and *species*, and how they apply to real substances, qualities and so on, as a precondition for the production of correct definitions and demonstrations, but they cannot do this without a study of categories (*In Cat.*, pp. 110A–111A). Here it is important to remember that logic was not viewed as the construction of purely formal systems, but as a way of reaching truths, and that this does indeed require some general consideration of what our propositions and formal arguments might be about.

3. Divisions of Aristotle's *Categories*

We must now turn to a more detailed consideration of the first part of the *Categories*. The work was often divided into three parts containing fourteen chapters. The first part takes up the *antepraedicamenta* which are preliminary to the main discussion, the second discusses the ten categories themselves, and the final part discusses the *postpraedicamenta*, those properties and conditions that follow from the categories (*In Cat.*, p. 112A). So far as the first part was concerned, there was some disagreement about whether the fourth chapter (Aristotle, *Cat.*, 1b25–2a10), which gives a rough list of all the categories, belonged here or in part two. The Conimbricenses,

like Ockham, opted for part one, Soto, like Pseudo-Aegidius, for part two.[31] Accordingly, he divides the discussion of *antepraedicamenta* into three chapters. The first presents three definitions, the second gives the two-fold division into things said with and without combination, and the third adds three rules. He notes that whereas he takes this list to present three types of *antepraedicamenta*, divided into seven particular *antepraedicamenta*, Paul of Venice had listed five, namely equivocals, univocals, denominatives, subject and predicate (*In Cat.*, p. 112A).[32] In order to explain why the *Categories* begins as it does, Soto states that equivocals come first of all because nothing can be put in a category until necessary distinctions have been made (*In Cat.*, p. 112A); and he gives the standard account of how equivocals, univocals, and denominatives are related to the categories. Equivocal or analogical things and terms, notably *ens*, are related to all the categories, univocal things and terms involve the relationship of superiors to inferiors within one category, and denominative things and terms involve the relationship of one category to another (*In Cat.*, p. 112B).[33]

4. Denominatives

This reference to denominative things, however, raises a problem. There was little dispute about the claim that there are equivocal and univocal things, and a special vocabulary had long been developed to distinguish between things (*equivoca equivocata*, *univoca univocata*) and words (*equivoca equivocantia* and *univoca univocantia*) (*In Cat.*, p. 112B).[34] Indeed, Soto claimed that this division supported his third thesis, that Aristotle intended to treat of things in relation to names, and names in relation to things (*In Cat.*, p. 113A); and he noted later that his own theory of denominatives was intended to support the same thesis (*In Cat.*, p. 115A). Nonetheless, the traditional account of

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31. William of Ockham, *Expositio*, p. 138; Conimbricenses, *In Cat.*, col. 302. For Pseudo-Aegidius, see Guilelmus Arnaldi, *Expositio*, fol. 15rA.

32. Paul of Venice, *In Cat.*, fol. 79rA.

33. See, e.g., Lambert, *Logica*, pp. 64–65; Guilelmus Arnaldi, *Expositio*, fol. 15rB, Walter Burley, *In art. vet.*, sig. 4vA–vB; Paul of Venice, *In Cat.*, fol. 80rB.

34. Ashworth 2003: 135.

denominatives suggested that they had to be treated differently. There is certainly the vocabulary to distinguish between *denominativa denominata* and *denominativa denominantia* (*In Cat.*, p. 114A), but the very definition of denominatives seems to tie them to words, for, following the translation by Johannes Argyropulos that Soto used, "those are called denominatives which have the appellation of a name from something with a difference only in case-ending; for instance, *grammaticus* has its appellation from *grammatica* and *fortis* from *fortitudo*."[35] Such a definition seems, Soto commented, to support the nominalist view that denominatives just are those concrete accidental terms which have a clearly different case-ending from the abstract accidental terms from which they are derived (*In Cat.*, p. 114A–B).[36]

Nonetheless, Soto argued that this construal was inconsistent with what Aristotle had actually said. First, Aristotle was clearly talking about things, just as he was in his definitions of equivocals and univocals (*In Cat.*, p. 114B). Here Soto is in agreement with Paul of Venice, who also argued that Aristotle had defined only denominative things.[37] Burley, who was more nuanced, said simply that Aristotle's description could be understood just as much of things as of words.[38] Second, if Aristotle had intended to define denominatives with respect to words, he would not have said that concrete terms are derived from abstract terms, for this is contrary to what the grammarians tell us about derivation.[39] For instance, 'justitia' comes from the genitive of 'justus' with the addition of 'tia' (*In Cat.*, p. 114B).[40] Third, it is clear from what Aristotle said about appella-

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35. Domingo de Soto, *In Cat.*, p. 111B "Denominativa ea dicuntur quae ab aliquo nominis appellationem habent, solo differentia casu; ut à grammatica grammaticus appellationem habet, et à fortitudine fortis."

36. See William of Ockham, *Expositio*, p. 147 (on the strictest sense of 'denominative'); John Buridan, *Summulae: In Praedicamenta* 3.1.3, pp. 11–13.

37. Paul of Venice, *In Cat.*, fol. 85rA.

38. Walter Burley, *In art. vet.*, sig. c 5rB.

39. This problem was an old one: see, e.g., Lambert, *Logica*, p. 66; Albertus Magnus, *De Praedicamentis*, p. 158A; Buridan, *Summulae: In Praedicamenta* 3.1.3, pp. 12–13.

40. For this example of a derivation, see Albertus Magnus, *De Praedicamentis*, p. 158A; Paul of Venice, *In Cat.*, fol. 85vA. (Paul often followed Albertus very closely.)

tion that the name 'white' does not have its appellation from white-ness, for it is snow that is called white, not the word itself (*In Cat.*, p. 114B).[41] Soto suggests that in their interpretation of the reference to appellation the nominalists confuse a term's signification or con-notation of an abstract entity with the process whereby a thing re-ceives appellation from that entity. This remark about the nominal-ists is borne out by what Marsilius of Inghen wrote, and Paul of Venice quoted: "Denominatives are concrete names differing from their abstracts only in their ending so far as the utterance is con-cerned, <and> connoting the thing which their abstracts signify."[42] On the other hand, Soto remarked, realists have a problem too, be-cause the reference to case-endings is hardly applicable to things (*In Cat.*, pp. 114B–115A).

In order to understand Soto's solution of these problems, we must first of all consider his list of the things which are involved in the process of denomination (*In Cat.*, p. 114A).[43] Whiteness (*albedo*) is the thing denominating a white thing (*res denominans album*). Peter, in whom whiteness inheres, is the denominated thing (*res denomina-ta*). The white thing (*album*) is the denominative (*denominativum*), though, using the distinction between *denominativa denominata* and *denominativa denominantia*, we can also regard the word 'album' as a denominative. However, we must realize that it is the thing which is white which has its appellation from whiteness (*In Cat.*, p. 114B). Soto goes on to discuss the problem of translating what Aristotle wrote (*In Cat.*, p. 115A). The old translation by Boethius uses the phrase 'according to a name' (*secundum nomen*), and runs: "those are

41. Walter Burley made a similar point in his middle commentary on the *Categories* (see unpublished edition by Alessandro Conti).

42. Marsilius, *In Cat.*, fol. 19vA: "Denominativa sunt nomina concreta, a suis abstrac-tis differentia quantum est ex parte vocis solum in fine, connotativa illud [*pro* istius] quod sua abstracta significant." Soto only refers to Marsilius as he is cited by Paul of Venice, but Paul quotes this very passage as follows: *In Cat.*, fol. 84vB: "Denomina-tiva sunt nomina concreta, a suis abstractis quantum est ex parte vocis solum in fine differentia, connotativa [sunt] istius quod eorum abstracta significant." Buridan, *Summulae: In Praedicamenta* 3.1.3, p. 12, remarks that to have appellation here is for the term to connote something beyond what it supposits for.

43. For texts relating to the following discussion, see Appendix Two.

said to be denominatives which have appellation from something according to a name with a difference only in case-ending."[44] According to Soto, people always take it that the phrase 'according to a name' governs the word 'appellation', and this is why Argyropulos used a genitive in his translation, "those are said to be denominatives which have the appellation of a name from something with a difference only in case-ending." However, Soto argues, the phrase 'according to the name' should be taken as governing 'with a difference in case-ending', so that the passage ought be read like this: "denominatives are things (*res*) which have their appellation from something, from which according to the name they differ only in case-ending."[45]

A lot depends on how 'appellation' is to be interpreted here. On the face of it, appellation has to do with what a thing is called, and this comes through in Burley's discussion of denominative things. He illustrates what it is for something, Socrates, to be called a grammarian denominatively by saying that Socrates is called this from the quality which is grammar because the name he receives on account of that quality differs from the name of the quality only by its word-ending.[46] On the other hand, Paul of Venice took up Albertus Magnus's definition of appellation as coming from the verb 'pello', whose meaning includes 'strike against', 'touch', and 'move',[47] and said that to have appellation is to be moved or touched by something not part of the denominative's nature. Such words as 'homo' and 'rationale' are not properly denominative because, although men and rational beings receive denomination according to the names of the abstract entities involved, they do not receive appel-

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44. Aristotle, *Aristoteles Latinus*. I 1-5, p. 5: "Denominativa vero dicuntur quaecumque ab aliquo, solo differentia casu, secundum nomen habent appellationem, ut a grammatica grammaticus et a fortitudine fortis."

45. Domingo de Soto, *In Cat.*, p. 115A: "Denominativa sunt res quae ab aliquo, a quo secundum nomen solo casu differunt, appellationem habent."

46. Walter Burley, *In art. vet.*, sig. c 5rB: "Verbi gratia, Sortes 'grammaticus' dicitur denominative ab illa qualitate que est grammatica, quia nomen quod Sortes contrahit ab illa qualitate que est grammatica differt a nomine illius rei, scilicet qualitatis, sola cadentia, id est, terminatione vocis."

47. Albertus Magnus, *De Praedicamentis*, p. 158B.

lation.[48] Paul's intent is to emphasize that the process of appellation involves a relationship between a real quality and a real thing that receives the quality, and not just a relationship between two names, even though that is also involved. As I read Soto, he is struggling to make the same point in somewhat different terms.

Accordingly, Soto goes on to state that Aristotle is not talking about the derivation of concrete from abstract words, for that is the grammarians' business; rather, he is focusing on the fact that a particular denominative, such as a white thing, is the product of an individual's reception of a quality from another thing, namely, whiteness. The fact that it is *called* 'white thing' is related, but secondary. As a result, a denominative name should be defined, not with reference to any supposed derivation from an abstract term, but with respect to its signification (*In Cat.*, p. 115A). A denominative name such as 'white thing' (*ly album*) is a name which formally signifies a form in accordance with the *ratio* by which it names the form's subject (*In Cat.*, p. 115A–B),[49] and so one should say that a concrete term signifies a form by connoting its subject rather than that it signifies a subject by connoting its form (*In Cat.*, p. 115B).[50] Soto ascribes the first view to Averroes, whom the realists follow and he ascribes the second view to Avicenna, whom the nominalists follow.[51] He does not mention Burley's view that 'album' signifies the aggregate of a subject and whiteness, so that the significate of the abstract term is part of the significate of the concrete term.[52]

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48. Paul of Venice, *In Cat.*, fol. 85rA. "Non tamen omnia concreta neque omnia adiectiva <sunt denominativa>, sed ista que habent appellationem, id est, a subiecto pulsionem …. Propterea 'homo' … et 'rationale' … non sunt proprie denominativa, quia etsi recipiunt denominationem secundum nomen suorum abstractorum, tamen non recipiunt appellationem neque sunt appellativa quasi a subiecto pulsa per recessum a natura illius."

49. The sense of *ratio* here is illuminated by Domingo de Soto, *In Cat.*, p. 114A: "… nomen rationis intelligatur definitio. Est tamen adnotandum, quod eodem redit si nomine rationis intelligatur conceptus obiectivus, quae est ratio significata in rebus …."

50. See Appendix Two for the text.

51. For more information, see Ebbesen 1988: 107-174.

52. Walter Burley, *In art. vet.*, sig. c 51rA.

Soto's final point about denominatives is that, contrary to the standard interpretation, and here he cites Pseudo-Augustine, they do not form a medium between univocals and equivocals (*In Cat.*, pp. 115B–116A).[53] Instead, they fall between univocals and multivocals or heteronyms, those cases where two different words pick out two different things. A denominative word or thing is neither entirely different from the denominating word or thing, nor is it entirely the same.

Soto had taken up the general issue of the relationship of denominatives to equivocals and univocals at the beginning of his Question about all three (*In Cat.*, 117A). A problem arose because on a narrow definition of 'univocal' as confined to the essential predication of genus, species, difference and *proprium*, univocals and denominatives were mutually exclusive.[54] Burley held that the groups overlap, claiming that a term is univocal if it has one definition, description, or *quid nominis* definition, and it is equivocal if it has more than one *quid nominis* definition, so that a denominative term can be either univocal or equivocal.[55] Soto agreed that the groups overlap. He said that the same word could be univocal, equivocal, and denominative, and he instanced the word 'sanum' which is said univocally of healthy animals, analogically of animals, urine and medicine, and denominatively in relation to 'sanitas'.

5. Answers to Objections

In his answers to doubts, Soto uses his theory of denominatives to settle some of the standard counter-examples to Aristotle's definition. What about concrete and abstract terms from the category of substance, such as 'homo' and 'humanitas' (*In Cat.*, p. 116B)?[56] Why

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53. Pseudo-Augustine, *Categoriae decem*, p. 138; Simplicius, *In Cat.*, p. 49. Conimbricenses, *In Cat.*, col. 327, claimed that Augustine and Simplicius were correct.
54. William of Ockham, *Expositio*, p. 146. Cf. Buridan, *Summulae: In Praedicamenta* 3.1.3, p. 13.
55. Walter Burley, *In art. vet.*, sig. c 5vA. Cf. William of Ockham, *Expositio*, p. 146.
56. See Albertus Magnus, *De Praedicamentis*, p. 159A; Roger Bacon, *Summulae*, p. 190; Paul of Venice, *In Cat.*, fol. 83vA.

should 'humanus' not be the denominative of 'homo',[57] or 'aureum' of 'aurum'[58] when 'homo' and 'aurum' are neither abstract nor accidental? Why should terms such as 'grammatica' and 'musica' used of females not be denominative?[59] Or 'studiosus', even though it does not look as if it is linked to its corresponding abstract, 'virtus' (*In Cat.*, p. 116B)?[60] What these counter-examples have in common is that they raise the question of what to say about words used for transcategorial predication when they do not meet the most restrictive definition of denominatives as involving only things with accidental intrinsic properties, and as being expressed by words whose beginning is the same and whose ending is different.

Soto's answer to all the counter-examples (*In Cat.*, p. 120A) is very similar to Burley's account of denominatives in the broad sense, an account which Burley attributed to Aristotle.[61] 'Homo' and 'humanitas' do not count, because they are not a genuine example of concrete and abstract, but are such only *secundum rationem* (*In Cat.*, p. 120A).[62] On the other hand, there is no reason to say that only accidental predicates are involved, for 'humanum' and 'homo' are perfectly legitimate, as are 'aureum' and 'aurum', among other examples (*In Cat.*, p. 120A–B). Nor is there any reason to say that only intrinsic predication is involved, for 'sanum' is said denominatively of urine, which is a sign of health, just as much as of the ani-

57. Roger Bacon, *Summulae*, p. 188; Walter Burley, *In art. vet.*, sig. c 5vA; Paul of Venice, *In Cat.*, fol. 84rB.

58. For similar examples, see Paul of Venice, *In Cat.*, fol. 84rB.

59. Boethius, ('musica') *In Categorias*, col. 168D; Roger Bacon ('grammatica'), *Summulae*, p. 187; Simplicius, ('musica'), *In Cat.*, p. 50; Guilelmus Arnaldi ('grammatica'), *In Cat.*, fol. 15rB; Paul of Venice ('musica'), *In Cat.*, fols. 83vB–84rA, ('grammatica'), *In Cat.*, fol. 84 rA.

60. This comes from Aristotle, *Cat.* 10b6–10: see *Aristoteles Latinus*, I 1–5, p. 67; Roger Bacon, *Summulae*, p. 187; Simplicius, *In Cat.*, p. 50; Paul of Venice, *In Cat.*, fol. 83vB. The cases of 'musica' and 'studiosus' are absolutely standard.

61. Walter Burley, *In art. vet.*, sig. c 5rB–vA. Cf. William of Ockham, *Expositio*, pp. 146–147.

62. Albertus Magnus, *De Praedicamentis*, p. 159A, wrote: "haec inflexio facta est ad similitudinem accidentis et non de ipsa rei natura"; Paul of Venice, *In Cat.*, fol. 83vB, said that denomination must come "ab alio, non tantum alietate rationis sed alietate realis."

mal which possesses health.[63] All connotative terms which signify an accident of some sort or, like the substantial terms cited, are presented in the mode of an accident, will count as denominative, and this is what Aristotle intended (*In Cat.*, p. 120B).[64] Presumably we can think of 'humanum' as a connotative term presented in the mode of an accident when it is said, for instance, of laws ('leges humanae': *In Cat.*, p. 120B). On the other hand, the criteria of a similar beginning and a different case-ending do matter. 'Grammatica' said of a woman is not denominative but straightforwardly equivocal,[65] and 'studiosus' is not a denominative term because it is different in form from 'virtus' and different in signification from 'studium' (*In Cat.*, p. 120B).

Soto ends his discussion with a brief reference (*In Cat.*, pp. 120B–121A) to the distinctions between three kinds of denominatives given by Marsilius of Inghen, and reported fully by Paul of Venice.[66] These are: (1) denominatives *in voce* alone, such as 'homo' and 'humanitas'; (2) denominatives *in re* alone, such as 'studiosus' and 'virtus', and (3) denominatives in both *vox* and *res*. Paul of Venice had called the first two groups denominatives *secundum quid*, and he included 'grammatica' in the second group.[67]

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63. Roger Bacon, *Summulae*, pp. 188–189, said that 'sanum' was denominative when said of an animal, but not when said of urine, and Burley said that it was denominative said of urine only in a broad sense (Walter Burley, *In art. vet.*, sig. c 5rB–vA). Strictly speaking, a denominative term must concern only intrinsic accidents. Paul of Venice (*In Cat.*, fol. 84rB) seems to allow extrinsic accidents as well.

64. Domingo de Soto, *In Cat.*, p. 120B: "In summa, omnia connotativa quae significant accidens vel habent se ad modum accidentis sunt denominativa. Et ideo dixit Aristoteles generaliter 'quaecunque habent ab aliquo nominis appellationem', sive ab accidenti, sive a substantia, sive a parte, sive a toto, sive ab intrinseco, sive ab extrinseco."

65. Guilelmus Arnaldi, *In Cat.*, fol. 15rB, allowed it to be denominative, because he appealed to *modi significandi* rather than case-endings, and the Conimbricenses, *In Cat.*, cols. 329–330, followed him in this.

66. Paul of Venice, *In Cat.*, fol. 84vA–vB; Marsilius, *In Cat.*, fol. 19rB. Where Soto has 'in re', Paul has 'in significatione' and Marsilius 'significatione'.

67. Paul of Venice, *In Cat.*, fol. 85vA-vB.

Conclusion

To conclude, what I find striking about Soto's discussion of the parts of the *Categories* that I have chosen to focus on is not only that he provides a coherent and thoughtful discussion, but that he displays the strong influence of the tradition of Oxford realism found in Walter Burley and Paul of Venice. It is easy to think of Soto as a Renaissance Thomist, but in fact, he was a well-read eclectic.

Appendix One: On Predication

[*In Cat.*, p. 108A] Sed quod nomina magis proprie praedicentur, probatur per primum argumentum supra factum. Praedicari enim sicut dici magis proprie convenit vocibus quam rebus. Item, quia propositio proprius est in nominibus, quam in rebus.

Quod vero res principalius praedicentur, probatur, quia propter unumquodque tale et illud magis; sed nomina solum praedicantur tanquam instrumenta et rerum signa, ergo res principalius praedicantur.

Alia enim est ratio proprie praedicationis, et alia est ratio principalis praedicationis. Proprietas namque consistit in significatione verbi 'praedicari', quod vocibus proprius convenit; et principaliter praedicari consistit in hoc quod res sunt finis, cuius gratia nomina praedicantur. . . .

Est tamen adnotandum, quod quemadmodum de universalibus dictum est, quod habent quidem fundamentum in re, sed fiunt universalia in actu per operationem intellectus, ita res ante operationem intellectus fundamentaliter praedicantur, quod nihil aliud est quam rationem, verbi gratia, hominis, inesse Petro substantialiter, et albedinem inesse accidentaliter. Sed actu praedicantur, quando intellectus actu considerat unum sub ratione praedicati, puta quod de alio dicitur, et aliud sub ratione subiecti, videlicet de quo aliud dicitur.

[p. 108B] . . . quamvis magis proprie verba dicantur et praedicentur, nihilominus passive et obiective res ipsae dicuntur et praedicantur. Dicimus enim et narramus res gestas.

[pp. 108B–109A] Dicendum ergo est, quod quamvis in rebus sint praedicatum et subiectum, nihilominus praedicatio non fit in rebus,

sed solum exercetur in mente, voce, aut scripto. Itaque in hac vocali, 'homo est animal', non solum vox praedicatur de voce, sed principaliter ratio animalis de ratione hominis. Immo profecto aptius loquebantur antiqui dicentes, voces non praedicari passive, sed praedicare; ut quemadmodum extrema huius propositionis, 'homo est animal', significant res, et res significantur per voces, ita voces praedicant rationem animalis de ratione hominis, atque adeo res praedicatur de re.

Appendix Two: On Denominatives

[*In Cat.*, p. 114A] Tertia definitio est denominativorum . . . . Atqui dubitare quis forte potest quid hic definiat Aristoteles, utrum nomina denominativa, ut sunt ly 'album', ly 'musicum', et similia, an res potius quas haec nomina significant et pro quibus supponunt. Ubi notandum primum est, quod in denominatione tria est a parte rei considerare, puta rem denominantem, rem denominatam, et denominativum. Verbi gratia, albedo est res denominans album, et Petrus in quo est albedo est res denominata, atque ideo album est denominativum. Sed denominativum quemadmodum de aequivocis dictum est, potest accipi, et pro denominativo denominato, puta pro re alba, et pro denominativo denominantem, scilicet pro hoc nomine 'album'.

[p. 114B] At vero quamvis nomina denominativa forte hoc modo describi possent, tamen sensus hic nihil attingit mentis Aristotelis, qui re vera denominativa pro rebus denominatis definivit.

(i) Primo quia eodem verborum tenore definivit denominativa quo aequivoca et univoca. Sed illa manifeste definivit pro rebus, ut ostensum est; ergo denominativa.

(ii) Praeterea quia si denominativa definisset pro vocibus, non dixisset concretum ab abstracto descendere, nam in vocibus saepe contingit contrarium . . . . sed res quae est album habet appellationem ab albedine.

(iii) [pp. 114A–115A] Et postremo hoc sit manifestum ex verbis Aristotelis cum ait "Denominativa sunt quae ab aliquo habent nominis appellationem." Enimvero nomen 'album' non habet appellationem ab albedine, sed nix est quae ab albedine habet appella-

tionum albi. Quocirca nominales hanc particulam Aristotelis nullatenus possunt adaptare suae definitioni – explica<n>t enim denominativum habere appellationem ab abstracto, per hoc quod est, denominativum significare abstractum de formali – cum tamen significare seu connotare abstractum, et recipere ab illo appellationem, res sunt diversissimae ... quemadmodum nominales illam particulam, 'habere appellationem ab aliquo', non possunt terminis adscribere, ita neque reales illud quod est, 'differre casu ab alio', possunt rebus accommodare. Et (ni fallor) illa particula, 'secundum nomen', rem fecit obscuram.

[pp. 115A–B] Hinc sequitur Aristotelem non intelligere concretum derivari ab abstracto. Hoc enim negotium grammaticorum est, ad voces pertinens, apud quos plura sunt abstracta quae potius formantur a concretis, ut 'sapientia' a dativo de ly 'sapiens', addita 'a', et omnia fere nomina in 'entia' a suis concretis. Sed solum dicit quod denominativum, puta res alba, accipit appellationem a re quae est albedo.

Quo fit ut neque nomen denominativum debeat definiri per derivationem ab abstracto, sed per suam significationem, ut ars servetur praedicamentorum, qua res in ordine ad nomina, et nomina in ordine ad res definiuntur.

Nomen ergo denominativum est nomen formaliter significans formam, ea ratione qua denominat subiectum, ut ly 'album'. Quare potius dicendum est concretum significare formam connotando subiectum .... quam significare subiectum connotando formam.

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